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THE ROUTE
OF THE
INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY
IN A
National, Commercial and Economical point of view.

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The following observations on the Route of Our Great National Work, have been hurriedly written amidst the pressure of other duties, and are submitted to the public at the present time, in the hope that they will have the effect of drawing attention to the importance of selecting for the Intercolonial Railway that route over which the road can be most cheaply built,—that will open up the largest section of Country, develop the most important resources, promote the interests of the greatest number of inhabitants, and conduce to the general welfare of the Dominion.

22nd November, 1867.

THE RAILWAY ROUTE.

To all who understand public feeling in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, it is well known that the consummation of the scheme of Confederation would never have been attained, had there not been incorporated in its provisions, a certainty that the Intercolonial Railroad would be built, and that the most important sections of the Province of New Brunswick would be ensured a connection by rail with the capital of the Dominion.

Long before the idea of an Intercolonial Railway was conceived, a military road from Quebec to Halifax, through New Brunswick, had been commenced. This idea probably led to the grander one of rendering the road more useful in a military point of view, and more conducive to the prosperity of the Colonies, by making it a Railway. The project of a common military road was then abandoned, and two officers of the highest engineering character were detailed to superintend the survey of a line which would combine the least number of miles with the greatest safety from available points of attack from the only quarter whence it is likely to proceed. After thorough examination, assisted by an efficient staff of officers, Major Robinson, having explored and accurately surveyed the several routes, after mature deliberation, decided upon that, not only best adapted for a military road, but the only one considered practicable, from the fortified City of Quebec, through British territory, to the Atlantic Coast.

Since that time, the hopes of the different Provinces have rested more upon Major Robinson's route than upon any other that has been proposed. Year after year passed away, successive Delegations from the governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and the Canadas met, and Representatives were sent to the British Government to secure its construction, but from many and various causes, it was found impossible to bring about anything like a satisfactory arrangement. At length the scheme of Union was

propounded, and among the reasons advanced for its adoption, none certainly had equal force with that which declared an Inter-colonial Railroad would be built, without which stipulation Confederation could not have been accomplished. Now that the Union has been consummated, one of the most important questions the present Government and Parliament of Canada will have to settle, is the route of this railway. In the decision of this question is involved the most important consequences,—not only the prosperity of the Dominion, but even its future safety. A number of conflicting sectional interests are at work, each striving to secure to itself the greatest advantage, without much regard to the general welfare. There can be no doubt that these conflicting claims should give way to the general good, that the route which offers the greatest benefit to the whole Dominion, and secures the greatest good to the greatest possible number of its inhabitants, is the one that should be adopted.

Up to the time of the publication of Mr. Fleming's Report, little was known of the several routes projected and supported by these rival interests.

That surveyed in 1848 by Major Robinson, of the Royal Engineers, was the only one respecting which anything like reliable data had been obtained. This survey was made in the most thorough and scientific manner, with the assistance of a staff of experienced practical engineers. It occupied nearly three years, and cost about £30,000 Sterling. Accurate working plans of every section were made, and no means were overlooked to have the results perfectly reliable. Mr. Fleming's Report, published in 1865, was the result of a very hurried examination which occupied but a few months; many portions of the various routes he describes were never explored, but merely guessed at from the general nature of the country, and though his labors were confessedly not of the character of a thorough survey, they threw some light on a number of routes both Southern and Central, but the result of his labour proves that he has failed to find a route which presents anything like the advantages that will be secured by a modification of the line carefully and accurately surveyed by Major Robinson.

In deciding the route to be adopted there are three modes in which the question must be viewed,

1st. In a National,

2nd. In a Commercial,

3rd. In an Economical point of view.

The route which combines the greatest advantages in these respects is that which common sense would point out as the one to be adopted. With reference to these three points the question will now be discussed.

IN A NATIONAL POINT OF VIEW.

It is the fashion in the present day, by disciples of the Cobden and Bright School, to pretend that the world has grown wise, that nations now see the folly and inutility of going to war to settle their disputes, and that the pen will in future fight battles heretofore decided by the sword. The Peace congress was startled from its idle dream by the Trent affair in 1862, and the present state of Europe shows conclusively that these dreamers know little of human nature, which, however much it is to be desired, has not yet attained the wisdom claimed for it. The Munroe doctrine is still cherished by America, and her "Manifest destiny" is still devoutly believed in by the large mass of her people. The "Alabama claims" are not yet settled, and if the United States persists in the ridiculous demand she has made, we know not how soon a rupture between the two nations may occur. The Fenian mob is no doubt an insane one, but an army of madmen can do more mischief than a disciplined force, and the experience of the last three years should not be lost. In that event, these Provinces would be the chief point in which England could be assailed, and this consideration should never be lost sight of in deciding the route of the Intercolonial Railway, which will be so powerful a means of successful defence.

The principal routes that have been proposed, and indeed the only ones that deserve serious consideration, are

1st. The Northern or Major Robinson's Line, which, starting from Halifax, runs by way of Truro to Shediac, thence crosses the Miramichi at Indiantown, continues northerly till it reaches Bathurst, then passes up the Bay Chaleurs to Dalhousie, thence by the Restigouche and Metapedia valleys through Rimouski to Trois Pistoles and River Du Loup.

2nd. A modification of this line, which we shall designate as the *Northern Central*, from Halifax pursues the same course to Shediac, runs down the E. & N. A. Railroad to Apohaqui station, thence runs north-east till it crosses Salmon River at the head of Grand Lake, thence running north it joins the Major Robinson line at Indiantown, on the Miramichi, and thence follows it to Quebec.

3rd. The Central line proper, which, starting from Apohaqui Station, runs round the head of Grand Lake, and, touching Fredericton, passes up the Keswick valley, thence across the Tobique range and round Temiscouta lake to River Du Loup.

4th. The Central line, designated on Mr. Fleming's map as No. 5, and so speciously advocated in a letter to Hon. William McDougall, Minister of Public Works, is identical with the Central line proper above described, from River Du Loup to Fredericton. At that point it crosses from the Eastern to the Western side of the River St. John, and by means of a branch from Fredericton, it joins the Western Extension line through Douglas Valley, and by that line reaches St. John in the neighborhood of the Suspension Bridge.

5th. The Frontier line, which, starting from St. John, passes up the Western side of that River to Grand Falls, where it crosses and continues along the Eastern bank to Little Falls, and thence by the Madawaska river and Temiscouta Lake to River Du Loup.

Of these routes the last is open to the objection that for many miles it passes close to the American Frontier, at points which offer every facility for the military operations of a hostile force; and this alone is sufficient to render its adoption so objectionable that no advantages of a sectional nature should, for a moment, prevent its rejection. Indeed this result is inevitable, as succes-

sive Colonial Ministers and many British Statesmen have declared (see despatches of late Duke of Newcastle when Colonial Secretary) that no line could receive the sanction of the British Government, which failed to secure the national object of security in time of war.

No such advantages, were they ten times as great as they are claimed to be, should have any weight with Parliament when the adoption of this route would render the road useless for the very purposes for which it was projected. This consideration places the Frontier route entirely out of the question, and we shall, therefore proceed to examine the merits of the others.

That we are fully justified in this conclusion will appear from the following remarks, and extracts from the correspondence :—

In 1851 a majority of the Government of New Brunswick refused to grant the necessary supplies for Major Robinson's line, unless the Imperial guarantee was also allowed to a branch line from Moncton to the city of St. John, 114 miles.

The Imperial Government refused to allow this and in a letter of Earl Grey to Mr. Howe of the 12th of June, 1851, there is the following passage, "I feel very sanguine of the ultimate assent of New Brunswick to the measure as proposed, and that we shall succeed in getting this most important work, destined as I believe to affect a change in the civilized world, accomplished."

In the spring of 1852, a delegation from Canada and New Brunswick went to England to ask the Imperial Government to give the guarantee to a line through the Valley of the St. John River to Canada, instead of by Major Robinson's route, to which the Government, in a despatch to Lord Elgin, dated the 20th May, 1852, refused in the following words :—"Her Majesty's Government are not only anxious, to act with the most perfect good faith towards the Legislatures and people of the Provinces, and to fulfil every just expectation which may have been held out by their predecessors, but they also sincerely desire to adopt all measures by which the welfare of the British Colonies in North America can be promoted as far as they can do so, consistently with their duty to the Empire at large, "But on a reference to the "correspondence which has already taken place on this subject, "and especially to the letters addressed by direction of Earl Grey

“ to Mr. Howe, on the 10th of March 1851, and Mr. Hincks on
 “ the 20th of February last, it will appear evident that no pledge
 “ had been given of assistance to any line except that originally
 “ proposed * * * .”

“ Among the peculiar advantages in this point of view which
 “ it was thought that the line selected on the report of Major
 “ Robinson and Captain Henderson would realize, were the
 “ opening up of a new tract of maritime country easily accessible
 “ with the railroad, but almost unapproachable without it, to
 “ Emigration from these Islands, and the affecting a safe and
 “ continuous route through the Provinces, which both by its
 “ distance from the American frontier and its proximity to the
 “ sea, might be peculiarly available for military purposes.”

This refusal set the matter practically at rest until the Intercolonial Railway convention held at Quebec on the 14th day of September, 1861, when it was again agreed to make application for assistance to the Imperial Government and to leave the question of route to be decided by that Government.

From this it will be seen that there is no hope of the British Government assenting to any line which varies much from the original one recommended by Major Robinson, and we predict that if the Lower Provinces persist in making new surveys with a view of thwarting this line, the completion of the road will again be indefinitely delayed.

✓The Central Line, No. 5, will require two enormously expensive bridges over the St. John, and as it will neither open up a new country, nor give railway facilities to populations now destitute of them, its claims are too small to merit much consideration. The means of communication with St. John by the River and Western Extension, with the Town of St. Andrews by Western Extension and the St. Andrews line, is quite sufficient to meet all the wants of the River Counties. ✓As this divergence from the Central line proper has no particular merits to recommend it over that line, but has several strong objections, besides that of running too near the American frontier, it may safely be put aside with the Frontier Line. But before taking leave of it we may remark that the disingenuous ingenuity exhibited by the author of the

letter referred to, to make out a strong case against the Apohaqui or Northern Central route, shows how the pursuit of a favourite hobby induces a man to lose sight of principle. He starts by saying that "the Bay Chaleur and Apohaqui route, has been suggested as a compromise between Major Robinson's Bay Chaleur "and a western route" and adds, "the extent of the sacrifice involved by so doing, will at once be apparent from the following figures." He then shows a difference of 123 to 158 miles in favour of a Western route. But to get at these figures he compares in one case, *the shortest Western route* (which is *not* the one he advocates as most desirable,) with the Apohaqui route; and in the other case, the route he *does* advocate with Major Robinson's route. When the comparison is properly made, of his No. 5 route with the Northern Central route, the difference to Halifax is 24 miles in favor of the latter, and to St. John but 56 miles against it,—and he fails to say one word about the great engineering difficulties that will beset his line, from which the Northern Central is free.

The Northern Central line combines all the advantages of Major Robinson's line, with several others not secured by the latter. It is about the same length *to build*, gives Kings, Queens, and Sunbury the advantage of the Railway without depriving Kent of the privilege, and opens up the Coal Regions of Grand Lake, Salmon River and Coal Creek. This being the case, we shall consider it as essentially Major Robinson's line, though preferable to it in all respects. This will leave the question confined to the consideration of two lines, the Northern Central and the Central proper, and as one of these is sure to be adopted, the merits of each shall have a fair and impartial consideration.

As the Nova Scotia portion of the road is common to both these, and will be the same, whichever is adopted, our attention will be confined wholly to that portion which passes through New Brunswick and Canada.

In the first place then, as regards the Central line proper in a national point of view, its proximity to the American Frontier is a serious objection. Mr. Fleming evidently favours this line, has done all that he "conscientiously" could to make a strong case in its favour, and reasons thus in reference to its adaptability as a military

road. In page 16 of his report, he says:—"I could not presume to express an opinion on the best military position for the Railway, or even enter into the question of route in a purely military aspect at all ; but in the absence of any specific instructions or suggestions on this point, I found it necessary to look for some rule by which to be guided at the beginning and during the progress of the survey. For a number of miles west of River Du Loup, the Grand Trunk Railway passes the North Western boundary of the State of Maine at a distance of scarcely 30 miles ; this, at all events in a military aspect, is a precedent, and may suffice to establish the minimum distance allowable between the contemplated line of Railway and the north eastern angle of the same State. I have accordingly laid off this distance on the accompanying general map of the country, from the frontier to points on the Trois Pistoles, Green River, the Restigouche and Tobique." The same subject is again introduced upon page 29 as follows : "The course taken by the line above described from the River Du Loup towards the southern part of New Brunswick is generally direct and at some distance from the Eastern Frontier of Maine. Except at one point, this distance is not less than that between the Grand Trunk Railway east of Quebec, and the northern boundary of the same State ; the point referred to lies to the north and east of Grand Falls on the River St. John. I may mention, however, that at this point, which lies between the Restigouche and the Tobique, I instituted a supplementary exploration after the survey was finished and the discovery was made that the line approached the Frontier nearer than desired. This exploration resulted in showing that there is every *probability* of a favourable location being obtainable, without keeping so close to the Boundary of the Province at this point."

Again he says, page 50, "Lines 5, 6 and 7 are generally not nearer to the boundary line than the minimum distance between the Grand Trunk Railway and the northern Frontier of Maine ; this distance, in a direct line, is from 27 to 28 miles."

But Mr. Fleming does not tell what he should have done, viz : that at one section only does the Grand Trunk approach within

30 miles of the frontier, while the Central line for many miles, indeed, from the Forks of the South West Miramichi to Green River, runs almost parallel, within 28 miles. Nor did Mr. Fleming allude at all to the important fact that the whole of the North Eastern part of Aroostook territory, which borders L'Islet and Kamouraska, through which the Grand Trunk runs, is an unsettled wilderness, through which no body of armed men could penetrate, being without roads or any means of communicating with a base of operations, which must necessarily be to the south-eastward of the mountain range which forms the water shed between the St. Lawrence and the St. John, which is near the boundary line between Canada and the United States, and which is almost impassible; thus making the distance for all practical purposes 80 miles to settlements, while the North Western or New Brunswick frontier is densely populated, has good roads in all directions, and offers every facility for military movements. Hence there is no analogy whatever between the two cases, and Mr. Fleming has lost sight of the rule by which he professes to be guided.

Now we ask, can any unprejudiced person, with these facts before him, divest himself of the conviction that a special effort has been made to favour the Central route? On page 16 of his Report, Mr. Fleming says, when speaking generally of an Intercolonial road:—"In dealing with the whole subject we cannot, however, overlook military considerations," yet in face of this has he not argued in favor of the line which completely overlooks them?

✓The Northern Central route, in a National point of view is entirely removed from this objection, for throughout its whole length to River du Loup it pursues a course the furthest possible removed from the frontier, places the whole breadth of the Province between it and the road, thus rendering it unapproachable except by water, and while England is mistress of the seas, this line has nothing to apprehend from foreign aggression. This great advantage, and a saving of 2 miles in distance is secured by adopting the Northern Central route, and also a further saving in construction, in consequence of the engineering difficulties which beset Mr. Fleming's Central Line, these will be more particularly examined under the Commercial and Economical views of the subject.

Should it ever become necessary to transport an army and its supplies across New Brunswick to Canada, the Northern route offers greater facilities than any other for doing so. In addition to the distance from the frontier, to which attention has already been called, the North shore line taps, at regular intervals, a succession of rivers and harbours, all affording points of debarkment for men and supplies. The rivers which are not touched at their mouths are usually crossed at the head of the tide, at points which, in every case, are easily reached. The cost of construction will be materially lessened by the expeditious manner in which provisions and plant can be placed within the reach of surveying parties and workmen engaged in building the road. From Miramichi, we reach the Nipisiguit, from the latter the Restigouche, whence, to the mouth of the Matapedia, stores can be safely taken at all times during seven months of the year. At Matapedia supplies for the line could easily be taken across to the St. Lawrence waters, where equal, if not greater facilities present themselves. By the Central route the only point that can be reached by water is at St. John, whence everything must be transported far into the interior. In alluding to the possible future of the Intercolonial road, Mr. Fleming says, page 53 :—" The United States Route by Bangor would intersect the " Grand Trunk Railway at Danville Station, 28 miles out of Port- " land, and thus form an unbroken railway connection, having " the same width of track from Halifax to Montreal and all other " parts of Canada. The distance from Halifax to Montreal by " this route is estimated at 846 miles, while the distance by the " Frontier and Central lines, which form the shortest connection " between Canada and the Bay of Fundy, embracing lines No. 1 " to 6 averages 871 miles in length. Thus, it is evident that the " passenger traffic of the Intercolonial may, on any of these lines " being constructed, be tapped near its root, and much of it drawn " away."

✓ " Under these circumstances, it is too apparent that the Inter- " colonial Railway may find in the United States route, a " formidable rival for Canadian passenger traffic, to and from " Europe, by way of Halifax. Fortunately, with a view to coun- " teract this difficulty, a line by the Bay Chaleurs would offer

"special advantages, which may here be noticed. The chart which accompanies this will show that the entrance to the Bay Chaleurs is so situated, geographically, that while it is about as near Europe as the entrance to Halifax harbour, it is, at the same time, several hundred miles nearer Montreal and all points West of that city.

"Some of the projected lines of Railway touch the Bay Chaleurs at Dalhousie and at Bathurst; the latter place is not admitted to be suitable for the purpose of Steam Navigation, and the former, although in possession of a fine sheet of water well sheltered and accessible at all conditions of the tide, is, nevertheless, from its position at the extreme Westerly end of the Bay, farther inland than might be wished. In order to reduce the Steamship passage to a minimum, it is desirable to have the point of embarkation as far Easterly as possible, and therefore the existence of a commodious harbour near the entrance of the Bay is of no little importance. A place named Shippegan, on the southerly side of the entrance of the Bay Chaleurs, appears to have many of the requisites of a good Harbour." Mr. Fleming then proceeds to shew on pages 54, 55, 56 and in Appendix F, that by means of a railway across Newfoundland, and a line of Steamers to Shippegan, the latter port could be reached

From London in..... 5 days 20 hours,

" Halifax.....	6	"	5	"
" St. John, N. B.....	6	"	4	"
" Quebec.....	6	"	10	"
" Montreal	6	"	16	"

This is certainly a strong argument furnished by Mr. Fleming in favour of the Northern Route, but he could have made it much stronger had he stated the fact, that the harbor of Paspébiac on the Northern side of the Bay Chaleurs, below Dalhousie, is entirely free from the objections that may be urged against the latter, as it is never impeded by ice, is open and approachable at all seasons of the year, and by means of a short branch could be connected with the Intercolonial at the junction of Metapédiac with the Restigouche.

The great resources of the vast region of Eastern Canada, in which is comprised Rimouski, Gaspé, and Bonaventure, containing 10,000,000 acres of Crown Lands, two-thirds of which is arable, with a present population of 60,000, which is fast increasing, would be opened up by the Northern Central line. Gaspé alone contains 3,000,000 acres of Crown Lands, most of which is arable ; around its coasts are to be found fisheries of the greatest importance and value. Salmon, cod and herrings are taken in vast numbers, and this source of wealth is annually extending. It bids to take its place among the great Petroleum regions of the world, and its claims should receive due consideration.

But there are other reasons why the Northern Central line should be preferred. Across the St. Lawrence is what, in Canada, is called the "North Shore," a region well known to be the best for fishing in the world ; it has long been famous for its seals, salmon and herrings, and only the means of transit are required to bring new and varied productions into the markets of the Dominion. Near the Moisie, Iron Mines have been opened, which are said to be highly productive. In the mere matter of bringing the Labrador and North Shore fish to markets, without forcing the fishermen to sail up the St. Lawrence, the Northern Line would offer advantages to that section which no other line could possibly afford, and without which this vast county must remain undeveloped.

At page 52, Mr. Fleming says : " In the event, however, of " Canadian traffic being prevented from passing through the " United States, the Intercolonial Railway would carry, during " winter, all the freight to and from the sea-board which would " bear the cost of transportation ; and as the cost would, to a " great extent, depend on the length of railroad to be passed over, " it would be of considerable importance to have the shortest and " most favourable line, selected, to the best and nearest port on " Bay of Fundy ; and therefore, with respect to the " through " freight " traffic, the frontier lines are entitled to the preference, " and next to them some of the central lines."

That the frontier lines can be considered the best routes for " through freight " traffic, according to Mr. Fleming's own showing depends upon a contingency which can never arise unless in

case of angry feelings existing between the United States and the Dominion and the Mother Country. Now, we believe that if even that contingency does arise, it will be found that the further a line is removed from the frontier, the more likely it will be to receive that traffic for transportation to the interior, provided, as in this case, the length of carriage is not materially increased.

IN A COMMERCIAL POINT OF VIEW.

In a commercial point of view that line which can be most cheaply built, by the shortest distance, and at the same time open up the largest extent of country for settlement, afford a market for the largest amount of produce and accommodate the largest population, is the one which both prudence and common sense will join in preferring. Now it must be borne in mind that no *reliable* survey has yet been made of the Central route. Even Mr. Fleming admits this—and all he claims is a *strong probability* that there are no difficulties which cannot, on a more thorough survey, be overcome. This argument applies to all the proposed lines, both Western and Frontier.

✓But even supposing the cost of the Northern line to exceed that of the Central, still in a commercial point of view it will be preferable, for it opens up a much larger extent of new country than the latter, and will tend to develop resources that are now lying useless for want of means to get them to a market. It will give more counties and a greater population an opportunity of participating in its benefits; it will open up a extensive country that will never have any other means of direct communication with the great markets of the Dominion; it will develop the Agricultural, Mineral, Lumbering and Fishing resources of the North, to an extent which no other means can equal; it will bring into the market a large portion of the arable public lands, and all these combined will furnish freight and business for the road, to an extent that no other line can hope to equal. In this respect it differs from all other lines suggested, as these will always find a rival in the River St. John, which runs through such a length of country in close proximity to them all.

The increased extent to which the Fisheries would be pursued and utilized by a Northern route is worthy a more

lengthy notice. The waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the lower part of that river, and those of the Bay Chaleurs and Miramichi Bay furnish the best fish in the world. Salmon, mackerel, shad, halibut, herrings and gaspereaux are taken in such vast numbers, that were the means of transport open, they would find their way to every town and city in Canada and the West, and a new source of traffic, of vast importance, would be established. Along the North Shore are to be found establishments for taking and preserving fish, compared with which those in other parts of the Province sink into insignificance. From the south side of the Bay Chaleurs to Shediac are to be found oysters beds of almost boundless extent, while lobsters may be taken in millions and sold for 60 cents per 100. Salmon, instead of being preserved in hermetically sealed cans, would be dispatched fresh to the Canadian markets of the Dominion and the West, either packed in ice, or frozen by the process lately introduced by an American at Bathurst. This trade alone would soon be of great importance, for at present there is annually caught at Miramichi 600,000 lbs., in Bathurst 274,000 lbs., and in Restigouche upwards of 342,000 lbs. These three rivers will suffice to show what a field for enterprise the construction of a railroad along this coast would open up. From a pamphlet lately issued upon the subject of the Intercolonial Railway we find that:

“ Every station on a line extending more than 16,000 miles, in every direction on this part of the continent, would have its depot daily supplied with the most delicious fish in the world, which could be sold at moderate prices, and still afford the merchants engaged in this traffic a heavy profit * * *

“ In return for fish, the people of the interior would furnish flour, meat, butter and all the fruits of their industry. Commerce would at the same time open up an immense source of revenue for the railway, for its extent would be limited only by the quantity of fish to be supplied by the sea touching the adjacent coasts. This market of fresh fish would supply the wants of a population of not less than 4,000,000 souls, which would consume ten times as much of this good fresh fish at a very low price, as they now do of salt fish at very dear rates and often in bad condition. Not fewer than 200 railroad stations would open up as many markets requiring to be furnished daily.”

This trade can be opened up by no other line, and this consideration alone should have great weight.

Between River Du Loup and the Metis, this route would pass through the rich and fertile country of Temiscouata and Rimouski, and would furnish an outlet to the agricultural products which are rapidly increasing in these counties. The road will here serve the import and export traffic of a fast growing population which now numbers upwards of 90,000 and is daily increasing. Rimouski is a flourishing town, with a Bishop's residence, a classical college, numerous schools, a Court House, Saw, Flour and Carding Mills, Printing offices, commodious Hotels, and all the evidences of rapid and steady progress. From the Metis the road will go by the valley of the Lake and River Matepedia as far as Restigouche, where government has recently constructed one of the best roads in the Province. The soil here is even more fertile than on the borders of the St. Lawrence, and possesses a climate no way inferior to the most favoured parts of the Province. Cattle graze here as early as the 15th of April, and comparatively little snow falls during the winter. This part of the country also is being rapidly settled and land is being taken up in all directions. The line by the Northern Central route will cross that part of the country we have just described, and is the only one that can open up the resources of that country and Gaspé, and carry the traffic of the population now dwelling, and which will hereafter dwell, in that vast district. It is likewise the only one which will serve the interests of the whole population of the Northern part of New Brunswick, comprising the Counties of Restigouche, Gloucester, Northumberland, and Kent. By adopting this route, every County in the Province will participate in the benefit of railway communication, except Victoria, which has, fortunately, the best market for its agricultural productions within its own limits, and a means of connecting with the great centres of commerce by the river St. John. On the other hand by adopting Mr. Fleming's Central route, the Counties of Kent, Northumberland, Gloucester, Restigouche, Bonaventure, Gaspé and Rimouski, will be entirely shut out from all hope of railway communication, and consequently from all hope of developing their vast resources. It is evident then, that taking all things into considera-

tion, the Northern Central route offers irrefutable arguments in its favour, and even Mr. Fleming bears us out in our opinion. At page 51 and 52 of his report he says :—" A Central route will have the least population to accommodate immediately along the line ; indeed between the Miramichi and St. Lawrence there is only one settlement, which consists of a few families on the Tobique River."

" A Railway constructed by the North Shore route, would pass through a country already in part settled ; and it would be of the greatest importance to Campbelltown, Dalhousie, Bathurst, Newcastle, Chatham and other towns and villages on the North Shore."

" A line by the Bay Chaleurs would pass through the Counties of Kent, Northumberland, Gloucester and Restigouche in New Brunswick, as well as Bonaventure and Rimouski in Canada. The population of these six counties amounted to 88,541 when the last census was taken ; a limited portion of the county of Gaspé, and the natural increase, may make the whole population over 90,000."

" From this data, the average number of inhabitants for each mile of Railway by the different routes would be nearly as follows :

" A Frontier line 260 per mile of Railway.

" A Central " 122 " "

" A Bay Chaleurs " 235 " "

" With regard to local traffic, therefore it would appear from the above, that the Railway would receive the largest population if constructed on a Frontier route, and least if constructed on a Central route."

In this connection it must not be forgotten that the Northern Central line which we are now examining starts from Apohaqui, and passes through the populous Counties of Kings and Queens, and touches both Sunbury and Kent. If the populations of these be taken into account it will give our Northern line as many inhabitants per mile as Mr. Fleming's figures show for the Frontier line.

In giving the result of his enquiries, Mr. Fleming says, page 57,
✓ " A Bay Chaleurs route would best secure the largest European

"*Passenger Traffic*," the carriage of *Mail matter* and *Express Freight*, and, next to a frontier route, would accommodate the "greatest amount of local traffic."

Here then we have the great preponderance of freight and passengers given to the Northern line by Mr. Fleming. For the "Frontier" he claims only "the largest amount of local traffic" and "Through freight in winter;" but we must reflect that this traffic springs from people not belonging to the Dominion, but residing in the State of Maine, and citizens of a foreign country. ✓ To the Central route he accords the character of being the "best for transportation of Through Freight," which transportation is hinged upon a contingency that arises only when the United States and the Dominion disagree. The Northern line on the contrary, secures three different elements of trade which are never mentioned in connection with either the Central or the Frontier, whilst he admits that next to the "Frontier line the Northern would always furnish the heaviest local traffic. In addition to these admissions of Mr. Fleming, the Northern Central line will tap no fewer than eleven seaports, which will all be its feeders, and increase its traffic; these are Buctouche, Richibucto, Kingston, Kouchibouguac, Chatham, Douglastown, Newcastle, Nelson, Bathurst, Dalhousie and Campbelltown. A railway by this route will give a great impetus to all these places, and industrious populations will soon add to the traffic of the road.

From these considerations, we think it apparent that in a Commercial point of view, the Northern Central route, has the greatest claims to adoption.

IN AN ECONOMICAL POINT OF VIEW.

Mr. Fleming, by some ingenious manipulation of figures, tries to show that the Central Line proper, No. 6, is shorter than the Northern Central. But let us examine this matter a little more closely, and see whether there is really a difference of distance in favor of the Central route proper, and against the Northern Central. We are quite willing to be guided by Mr. Fleming's figures when they pertain to his own original lines, but we cannot allow him to alter the carefully ascertained figures of Major

Robinson, after his own confession that he has never gone over the survey of this gentleman, with the exception of the Metapedia section of 70 miles. We shall therefore be guided by Major Robinson.

The total distance from Halifax to Quebec, as given by Major Robinson's Report of the Survey of 1848, (see Journals of Assembly, 1849) is 635 miles. Since that date, there have been constructed from Halifax to Truro 61 miles, and from Quebec to River du Loup, 118 miles, which show 179 miles constructed leaving yet unbuilt 456 miles to Quebec.

Let us now compare Mr. Flemings estimate of the Northern Central with the accurate survey of Major Robinson.

Mr. Fleming shows the distance to be built by the Central proper to be 452 miles, this leaves 4 miles only in favour of construction mileage for the Central proper, but in point of cost the 456 by the Northern Central, at Major Robinson's estimate of \$35,000 per mile, is \$15,960,000, while 452 miles of the Central proper at Mr. Flemings own estimate of \$46,000 per mile, will be \$20,792,000 showing a difference in favour of construction of \$4,632,000 for the Northern Central. As to distance to be run Mr. Fleming calculates the Central proper to be 572 miles, while Major Robinson makes the Northern Central 570 miles, showing a difference of 2 miles in favour of the latter line.

Mr. F. calculates the distance from River du Loup to Halifax by Apohaqui to be 616 miles, to which we must add 118 miles from River du Loup to Quebec, making a total of 734 miles. Major Robinson's more careful survey made the distance from Halifax to Quebec 635, to which we must add 70 miles between Apohaqui and Shediac, which did not enter into Major Robinson's line. This will make the distance between Quebec and Halifax *via* Apohaqui 705 miles, still leaving a difference in favour of the Northern Central of 29 miles between Major Robinson's accurate survey, and Mr. Fleming's more hasty one. The manner in which Mr. Fleming has managed to lengthen out Major Robinson's line, may be seen from his own admission, page 47 of Report, where he says: "The distances here submitted considerably exceed those given by Major Robinson and others; *the allowances which I have made for curvatures may*

account for this excess." But as a due allowance for curvature doubtless entered into Major Robinson's carefully prepared plans and calculations, we can confidently rely on the correctness of his figures.

If, however, we take Major Robinson's line "pure and simple," from Quebec to Halifax, as 635 miles and place it in juxtaposition with the Central line, which, by Mr. Fleming's own showing, is 572 miles from River du Loup to Halifax, to which must be added 118 miles to Quebec, making 690 miles, we then have a Northern line that is actually 55 miles shorter than Mr. F.'s favorite one.

It does not, however, follow in all cases, that the mere *saving of distance* is the object to be attained in laying out a railroad. There are other considerations, which often make it preferable to adopt a longer line, and that one on which the greatest amount of traffic is to be had, is preferable to a shorter one, which will not afford this to the same extent. The line which affords the easiest slopes and the most level surface is preferable, even if longer, to one on which the grades are heavy and the surface rough and uneven. The cost of levelling declivities should always be avoided, even at the expense of distance, for steep ascents and descents always occasion delays, and necessitate a lower rate of speed and greater expense. By the table of gradients which we give, and which even Mr. Fleming admits is largely in favor of Major Robinson's line, it will be seen that the advantages in this respect are greatly in favor of the Northern Central.

But, if *shortness is the great desideratum*, and must be had at any sacrifice, we are now prepared to assert and show that a *still shorter line* can be had, and that, too, *by a Northern route*. By leaving the Major Robinson line at the point where it crosses the Restigouche, and instead of running along the Bay Chaleurs to Bathurst, we ascend the Valley of the Upsalquitch, and then, by one of the tributaries of the North West Miramichi, proceed to Indiantown we shall still further shorten the distance by 40 miles, making a line 95 miles shorter than the Central; but this will be at the expense of all Gloucester and the most populous portion of Restigouche, and while we do not consider it advisable, we mention it for the purpose of showing how much the advocates of *short*

lines cared for shortness when it *did not favour their sectional views*, and how little disposed they were to consider the interests of other portions of the Dominion.

The Northern Central line to Apohaqui, via Bathurst, possessing, as we have already shown, some important advantages over the Northern line "pure and simple," and also over this shorter line which we have shown to be feasible, we think it will be admitted, that even though somewhat longer than the latter, it has the strongest claims to adoption.

Mr. Fleming's Central Line passes the summit between the St. Lawrence and the Restigouche waters at a level of 1515 feet above the sea, and has three other additional summits between the Restigouche and the Tobique, the Tobique and Miramichi, and the Miramichi and Apohaqui. These he passes with maximum grades of 70 feet to the mile, making an aggregate rise and fall of upwards of 5000 feet, while Major Robinson's line encounters but one summit 750 feet in height at the Tartigow River, and passes it with a continuous grade of only 56 feet to the mile. After passing this point, the North Shore line continues with gentle undulating gradients, and an unexceptionable alignment, for some 250 miles, to Bay Verte.

When it is considered that a rise of 20 feet in a mile is equal to an additional locomotive, we are fully justified in asserting that in consequence of the higher grades on the Central route, the Northern Central could not only be more cheaply built and maintained, but that a train could start from Quebec, and reach Apohaqui in a much shorter time, and with the assistance of an additional engine over the single summit of the Metapedia, could carry much more freight, even if the Northern Central line was as much longer, as we have shown it to be shorter, than the Central Proper.

Mr. Fleming's report shows that in some places the grades on the central route run as high as 70 feet per mile for 11 miles continuously ascending south, and $9\frac{6}{10}$ miles ascending north, and almost all are over 45 feet, while the grades he gives for a section of 70 miles of the northern route by the Metapedia, which Major Robinson pronounced the *most unfavorable* on the whole route surveyed by him, reach only 60 feet in one instance of $2\frac{7}{10}$ miles

in length, while they are generally from 20 to 30 only, and much more favorable than those of any other line given by Mr. Fleming.

On the other hand the northern route has been carefully surveyed throughout its whole length by a most competent Engineer, selected by the British Government for his eminent capacity in surveys of this nature, was beyond the influence or suspicion of political intrigues or sectional interests, and consequently the results given by him can be relied on with confidence. Therefore we are justified in concluding, not only from Mr. Fleming's admissions, but from Major Robinson's careful survey, that the expense of building the Northern Central line, will be very much less than that of Mr. Fleming's Central line.

That we are fully justified in this conclusion, the following gradients from Mr. Fleming's Report, pages 29 and 34 will indisputably show:—

CHARACTER OF GRADES ON WHOLE SURVEYED LINE FROM RIVER DU LOUP TO APOHAQUI BY THE FLEMING CENTRAL LINE.

		Total length in miles.	
		Ascending South.	Ascending North.
Grades under 20 feet per mile.	41.9	58.4
“ from 20 to 30 feet per mile.	9.6	29.9
“ “ 30 “ 40 “ “	13.9	21.8
“ “ 40 “ 50 “ “	15.2	9.8
“ “ 51.9 “ “	2.1	2.1
“ “ 52.8 “ “	18.3	8.7
“ “ 53.5 “ “		1.4
“ “ 54 “ “		1.3
“ “ 56 “ “	1.5	
“ “ 58 “ “		1.6
“ “ 59 “ “		2.4
“ “ 60 “ “	4.7	10.9
“ “ 61 “ “	3.3	
“ “ 63 “ “	0.9	
“ “ 64 “ “	3.2	
“ “ 65 “ “	9.5	1.4
“ “ 66 “ “		1.0
“ “ 68 “ “	2.7	8.0
“ “ 69 “ “	1.7	
“ “ 70 “ “	11.5	9.6

CHARACTER OF GRADES MATAPEDIA SECTION.

Grades under 20 feet per mile.	6.9	11.7
“ from 20 to 30 feet per mile.	4.4	9.2
“ “ 30 “ 40 “ “	2.4	7.0
“ “ 40 “ 50 “ “	1.6	2.8
“ “ 50 “ 52.8 “ “	2.8	6.2
“ “ 60 “ “		2.7

Mr. Fleming also shows that, upon this section of 70 miles, there will be required only 570 feet of Wrought Iron bridging.

Mr. Fleming has set down the width of the cuttings on both routes at a uniform width of 30 feet, but he admits that where the snow-fall is light, this width can be reduced. As the minimum fall of snow will certainly be on the Northern route, a great additional saving will be made in constructing the road by this line.

In the chapter "Climatic Difficulties," Mr. Fleming states that the chief "difficulty to contend with on the route of the proposed railway is *snow*." Now, when we consider that by the line he advocates, he has travelled through the *interior* of the country and reached the higher altitudes that there prevail, we are not surprised to learn that the chief difficulty is snow. It is well known that along the sea shore the fall of snow is never so heavy as in the interior of the country. This arises from the higher temperature of the atmosphere near the sea, where the moisture more frequently takes the form of rain. The difference of altitude also makes a difference in the quantity of snow, as in these cold regions all the moisture takes the form of snow instead of rain. This snow also remains longer on the ground in Spring, and is often found very deep as late as the month of May. On the Grand Trunk the cars are not delayed so much between River du Loup and St. Thomas, as between the latter place and Quebec, and this difference is observed to be greater, the farther we go down the River.

"In the Metapedia Valley very little snow falls; and far down the ground is generally bare every year about the month of April. The wind, following the sweep of the Valley, never causes snow-drifts. With but trifling cost for keeping, the road there is always open for winter conveyance, and we can say, with a certainty based upon a through knowledge of the country, that in ordinary winters, the trains will never experience any stoppage or considerable delay from snow on a well constructed road running through the Valley."

Now, as we know that the levels of Mr. Fleming's line are found on the high lands of the Tobique ridge, situated in the interior we can easily perceive that two agencies of nature are at work to produce the result that Mr. Fleming so much dreads.

Let us now examine the total cost of constructing the Northern Central line by Apohaqui, compared with that of the Central proper to the same point, Mr. Fleming is at liberty to use his own figures in his own line, but we shall consider Major Robinson's sufficient for his line, until some competent authority, by an equally careful survey, disproves them. Taking then Mr. Fleming's statement that there are 452 miles to be constructed from River du Loup to Halifax, via Apohaqui, by the Central proper, and applying to them his own estimate of \$46,000 per mile, we have \$20,792,000 as the total cost. By Major Robinson's figures we have 456 miles to construct by the Northern Central Route, which at Major Robinson's estimate of \$35,000 per mile, will give \$15,960,000, showing a difference in favor of the Northern Central of \$4,632,000.

✓ On the North Shore route we have an almost uninterrupted line of road near the sea, and that, too, upon the lowest levels, both of which are favorable to a minimum fall of snow, consequently the expense of working the Central line will far exceed that required in running the Northern one. On the Central line there will be required a great number of snow ploughs, and many additional Engines, as three powerful locomotives will be necessary to work the plough through the deep snow that will inevitably bury the track. A greater number of workmen will also be required to keep the track in running order during the winter, and as this line runs through a perfect wilderness where no men can be had, the obstacles will be very serious. Even on the Grand Trunk it frequently occurs that from 50 to 80 men are required to shovel the snow from the track when the drifts are too heavy for the plough. Where are these men to be had through the wilderness, where their services will be most needed? So that according to Mr. Fleming's own showing, the Central line, in this respect, will be more objectionable than the Northern one.

✓ In his estimates of the cost of the two routes, Mr. Fleming has entirely overlooked the roads that run near the Northern route, in every direction, especially through the Metapedia Valley, while, for several hundred miles along the Central line, there are no means of communication, and neither provisions nor materials of any kind can be transported till these are provided. This fact must add largely to the expense of the Central, while, to the same extent, it will reduce that of the Northern route.

From this careful examination of the matter, we cannot divest ourselves of the conviction that a special effort has been made to favor the Central and to discourage the Northern line. But, we think we have shown beyond a doubt, that St. John, in this matter of the route, will be fairly dealt with by adopting the Northern Central, striking Apohaqui. And if more is done in her favor, it must be done not only at a greater cost, and to the total destruction of the military character of the road, but also at the expense and sacrifice of the interests of the whole northern part of New Brunswick, and of the eastern part of Lower Canada.

SUMMARY.

Although a number of routes have been projected by sectional interests, of which Mr. Fleming's Report notices no fewer than *fifteen*, it will be perceived from the results of his observations at page 50 of his report, that of these fifteen projected lines, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, are all open to the insuperable objection that they run so near to the United States boundary that their character as military lines is completely destroyed. In addition to this, they are all open to the other objections we have urged—the frontier lines are unnecessary, as the river counties are now, or soon will be, amply provided with means of communication by the roads and branches that are now in course of construction; they open up no new country that will not have ample means of outlet by the river and these railroads and branches. The central lines offer great engineering difficulties, are in more danger of obstruction from the snow and storms of winter, and have only one point at which they can be reached by water, even if their construction is practicable, which, from the insufficient surveys yet made, is very doubtful. They will run through a country with the smallest number of inhabitants, and only the most unimportant branches of industry and enterprise will receive advantage from their construction. They will totally ignore the great fishing interests of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the lower waters of that river, the Bay of Chaleurs and Miramichi Bay. By any of these routes the whole northern part the Province, including Northumberland, Gloucester, Restigouche, Bonaventure, Gaspé and Rimouski will be shut out from any hope of participation in the ad-

vantages of railway communication, and their great mineral, agricultural, and fishing resources will remain undeveloped. The immense mineral resources of Gloucester and Restigouche are in part known from the hasty examinations of Dr. Gesner and Professor Bailey, and there is not the slightest doubt that these counties, when more carefully explored, will be found as rich in valuable minerals as any portion of the Dominion. The construction of the Railway through these counties will do more to develop these resources than any other means that could be adopted.

Is it fair, then, that the Northern and Eastern Counties, which have so largely contributed to the revenues of the country, from which the various lines on the South and West of the Province have been either subsidized or built, and by which the counties of Westmorland, Albert, Kings, Queens, St. John, Sunbury, York, Carleton and Charlotte have been linked together by the European and North American, the Western extension, the St. Stephens and Woodstock branches, the St. Andrews line, and latest by the Fredericton branch—is it fair that these northern counties should now have their interests neglected, and that they, in common with the Eastern part of the Province of Quebec, should be further ignored for years to come; while, in addition to their claims, military considerations, shortness of distance, and economy of construction, all demand the adoption of the Northern Route. They have always looked forward with confidence to the time when their great want—access to the markets of the world—would be supplied, by means of this road, which they were justified in doing by the reiterated assertions of successive Colonial Secretaries, that the military character of the road would never be lost sight of. Is it fair, we ask, that when every consideration, National, Commercial and Economical, points to the Northern Central Route as the one best calculated to serve the interests of the whole Dominion; that faith should now be broken with them, and that to serve the interests of a small section of the Province of New Brunswick, they should be cut off for ever from all hope of participating in the benefits of railway communication, which all other parts of the Province will enjoy?

In this connection we may state what the Hon. S. L. Tilley,

Minister of Customs, said in his speech at the hustings in St. John; that he would not pledge himself to a Northern line, nor to a Central line, nor to a Frontier line, but when the subject came up for discussion in Parliament, he would support that line which was best calculated to secure the greatest general benefit to the whole Dominion. We may also quote the following from a speech delivered by the Hon. P. Mitchell, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, at the Declaration of the Poll for the County of Northumberland, when the Hon. Mr. Johnston was elected by an overwhelming majority. We find this in the *Canadian News*, a paper published in London, and the editor makes special mention of it in connection with the route of the railway. The Minister's acquaintance with the subject, in all its bearings, is well known, and his opinions are worthy of consideration :

"I fear not all their opposition nor their array of facts and arguments. The Major Robinson line is the only route that has been surveyed throughout—we know every mile of it, from Shediac to Rivière Du Loup—and we can speak confidently without drawing on our imagination for our facts, or our fancy for our arguments. Those other routes of which we hear such feasible accounts have only a paper existence, and no reliable data has yet been furnished on which any man who fairly and honestly looks into the matter can base an argument.

"The Southern and Western portions of the Province have already been largely aided by subsidies from the Treasury, of which you have had to pay your share, and common justice demands that a portion of that large sum which is now to be expended shall aid in opening up these northern counties. It has been said by one of the opposition papers that I am 'the evil genius of St. John'—that I desire to divert from that city the terminus of the railway. I do nothing of the kind. I desire to see her as prosperous as an enterprising population and great natural facilities can make her. I do more—I am anxious to see her get the terminus of this great highway, and on the part of the people of the north, I am willing to accept as a compromise of conflicting interests a route, which, while it suits us in the North, will give St. John the terminus as near the city as the Central route surveyed by Fleming, or any other route east of the

"river, would give it. This offer is a fair one, and if accepted and
 "acted upon it will bring every county in this province, with one
 "exception, within the circle of railway communication; and I
 "much mistake the people of St. John if a proposition which ap-
 "peals so strongly to their sense of justice as well as their interests
 "will not meet their approval."

These considerations alone, independent of any others, should have great weight in the decision of this question, and point to the remaining lines, Nos. 13, 14 and 15 as those offering the greatest advantages to the whole Dominion. No. 13, is the line we have designated as the Northern Central, No. 14 is the same line from River du Loup to Indian town on the Miramichi; from that point, instead of running southerly to Apohaqui, it pursues a south-easterly course to Moncton, where it joins the Shediac road. No. 15 is Major Robinson's line "pure and simple." Of these three, which all combine the merits of a safe military road, with the advantages of cheap and easy construction, added to the further advantages of opening up more populous portions of the country, and developing more important interests than any of the other lines, we have already shown that No. 13 possesses some merits not shared by Nos. 14 and 15; these consist in running nearer to the city of St. John; in passing through the populous counties of Kings, Queens, and Sunbury, without shutting out Kent, in opening up the coal regions of Grand Lake, Salmon river and Coal Creek. While these advantages are gained by the modification of Major Robinson's line, none which that line offers are lost. It still remains the best,—in fact the only line that can be at all suitable as a national and military road, and this consideration, we feel assured, will never be lost sight of, either by the British Government, or by that of the Dominion. When we add to this, that the cost of construction, fitting out, and maintaining, will be less, that the cars can traverse it with greater speed, more facility, and less probability of accident, that the prices of freight will be less on this route than on one which has very high grades, passes through unsettled and uncultivated solitudes, greatly obstructed by snow, we feel assured, that on due consideration, this Northern Central route will commend itself to the favor of all who have the prosperity of the Dominion at heart. If this route is not adopted,

the whole north shore will be neglected, the interests of the Dominion will be ignored, its military protection, its commerce, its colonization, and its industry will be sacrificed to the advantage of a small portion of the Province of New Brunswick.

It has been said, and we doubt not it is probable enough, that some parties have offered to build the Frontier Line and run it to the satisfaction of the Government for a bonus of \$5,000,000 ; but we have seen several instances of the manner in which such engagements are fulfilled, and judging from these, we have no hesitation in expressing our firm conviction that this would prove, in the end, the dearest possible mode in which the road could be secured. What assurance can these parties give that after they have got Government committed to their scheme, they will not do as other private parties and Companies have done in the cases of the Grand Trunk, the Western Extension and the European and North American Road. We can only breathe a fervent prayer that no such proposition will, for a moment, be entertained,—delay and ultimate loss is inevitable. The experience of the past is too costly to be bought over again.

APPENDIX A.

The letter addressed by J. W. Lawrence of St. John, to Hon. W. McDougall, Minister of Works, is written with so palpable a view of bolstering up his favourite Western route No. 5, at the expense of the whole Northern part of the Province of New Brunswick, and he has made use of arguments so contradictory in support of it, that we should not consider the letter worthy of much attention, even were the line he advocates free from the insuperable objection that it is totally unfit as a military route. But in order to show the weakness of his position, we shall notice some of the points on which he founds his strongest arguments in its favour.

In a national point of view, then, we observe that Mr. Lawrence, well aware of the objectionable nature of his pet line in a military

point of view, assumes the role of a philosopher and gives us a passage on naval armaments, to show that a military road would be useless, and then diverges into social ethics to prove that it is unnecessary. He says ; page 10 :—"In 1848 Major Robinson recommended the Northern Route on military grounds, since then, from the revolution in *Naval Armament*, its claim has entirely disappeared. Then it would have been comparatively safe from attack from the water ; now, from gunboats, steam frigates and armor plated ships, for seven months of the year, it would be exposed to the enemy.

" *Treaties* and Orders in Council have thrown open the waters of the Gulf and Bay to the world.

" There are no grounds of alarm from our American neighbours. Their Commercial and other interests are so much in common with ours, and like ours, all on the side of peace, that should any disturbing element arise, it will be disposed of in the future as in the past, by the pen and not the sword.

" Better then accept the situation at once, and build the line on a *commercial basis*, knowing that as a military work, should war occur, it would be in danger wherever placed. If constructed as a military road, it would *invite* attack ; while, as a commercial enterprise, its peaceful mission would be its *shield*."

This is the flimsy reasoning used by Mr. Lawrence to make us lose sight of the very consideration which first suggested the road. His wish to deceive is apparent in the very first line of this extract. He says : " Major Robinson *recommended* the Northern route on " military grounds ; " thus conveying the idea that among several routes, Major R. *advised* the Northern route for military reasons, when he well knew, or at least every one else well knew, that the sole object of Major Robinson's survey was to find a suitable route for a military road, and that this has never been lost sight of either by the British or Provincial Governments, is just as well known to every one but Mr. Lawrence. The late Duke of Newcastle, when Colonial Secretary, said emphatically, in the course of conversation with the delegates, that no line which did not secure the advantages of a safe military road would ever receive the assent of

the British Government, and this has been the unvarying tenor of all subsequent dispatches.

That any improvement in "*Naval Armament*" should be urged against the necessity of a *Military road*, is an argument quite worthy the brain of this would-be philosopher, and on a par with that in which he says a military road would *invite* attack, while the peaceful mission of a commercial one would be its *shield*. When human nature generally attains the high point of perfection arrived at by Mr. J. W. Lawrence, and nations have outlived the passions and prejudices that now sway them, this kind of reasoning may possibly have some weight, but while, as at present, there are subjects of dispute between the American and British Governments, which may at any moment lead to a rupture of the peaceful relations which now happily exist, true wisdom dictates the use of all means to make our position as secure as possible, and to this end the military character of the road will not be lost sight of because Mr. Lawrence cannot see its necessity.

On page 11, Mr. Lawrence says:—"As the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario have to pay eleven-thirteenths of the cost of the Intercolonial Railway, and have never made its construction a condition of Union, as New Brunswick and Nova Scotia have done, as set forth in the 145th section of the Act of Union, it is only right that the route to be chosen, be one which will secure to their commerce a short highway to the best port on the Bay of Fundy, by the shortest and most favorable line. This all important consideration should never be sacrificed for any sectional interest."

We fully endorse this, and this very consideration, as we have shown in the course of our remarks on the several routes, induces us to support the Northern Central route, as, apart altogether from the military aspect of the road, the interests of Quebec and Ontario are as fully secured by it, as they would be by the Western line No. 5, as we shall now prove.

By some ingenious management of figures, taken from Mr. Fleming's imperfect survey, he conveys the impression that the Northern Central necessitates a great many more miles to be built,

and a great many more miles to be run. Now we shall take Major Robinson's figures, as being more worthy of confidence; by them we find that from River du Loup to Halifax there will have to be built by the Northern Central, 456 miles, only 19 miles more than he claims by No. 5 Western. These 456 can be built according to Major Robinson's estimate for \$35,000 per mile, while Mr. Fleming estimates \$46,000 per mile for the 437 which must be built by the No. 5 Western. Now in construction alone the saving by the Northern Central route will be \$4,142,000, and the cost of maintaining and keeping it free from snow will be much more than will be required for the latter. In regard to the *distance to be run*, the saving by the Northern Central will be 24 miles, for according to Major Robinson's survey, the distance from River du Loup to Halifax by the Northern Central is 570 miles. While by Mr. Fleming's survey the distance of the Western No. 5 is 594. From this the reader may judge of Mr. Lawrence's fairness, and his fitness to be a guide in this matter.

On page 12, Mr. Lawrence quotes from a professor of Civil Engineering the following; which he thinks tells in favor of his Western Line:—"From the great cost of the superstructure of a railway, and the continually increasing expense of keeping it in repair, it is highly desirable that it should be *as straight* and consequently as short as possible. As the earth-work of a railroad costs almost nothing for repairs, while the expenses of maintenance of its perishable superstructure is very great, and proportional to its length, as is also the cost in fuel, wages, and wear and tear of the engines, and running of the road, it will often be advantageous to make large expenditures in order to lessen the length of the road."

This on the face of it is a strong argument for the Northern Central, for all the cost of wear and tear of engines, fuel and maintenance of the road, is in its favour, from the enormous grades on the Western Line, and the great preponderance of snow which it will inevitably have to encounter. But we can quote just as good authority against his engineer, and against his favourite line. Another Professor of Engineering writing of this very Intercolonial road, truly observes:—"The idea of constructing a rail-

“ road in a straight line, from one point to another because it is the
 “ shortest, is an erroneous one. A point of the greatest importance
 “ is to select a route where the slopes are easiest, and the most
 “ level and firmest surface is to be found. The route with this
 “ advantage is the preferable one ; the cost of levelling declivities
 “ ought to be avoided in the building of railroads, for steep
 “ ascents and descents will always occasion delays and stop-
 “ pages of the trains.”

Mr. Lawrence quotes Sir Francis Hincks in favor of his pet line, as follows : “ The North Shore Line was distant from the
 “ more populous settlements of New Brunswick and from her
 “ principal Cities of St. John and Fredericton, and would pass
 “ through a thinly settled Country to the St. Lawrence. In a
 “ commercial point of view the two lines do not admit of compa-
 “ rison, while the section of line between River du Loup and
 “ Quebec would be less than thirty miles distant from the Ame-
 “ rican frontier, and would be nearly if not quite as much exposed
 “ to the enemy as that passing by the Valley of the St. John.”

We have shown, under the Commercial view of the subject, that the Northern Central has nothing to fear in a fair comparison with *any other line*, as regards the population of the country it passes through, taking its whole length, and we have shown, that more important interests will be served and developed by it, and with reference to distance from the frontier, we have shown, Sir Francis to the contrary notwithstanding, that it is not nearly as much exposed to danger from hostile aggression, at the section between River du Loup and Quebec, as it would be passing by the valley of the St. John.

Mr. Lawrence places great stress upon the importance of making St. John the Atlantic port for the commerce of the St. Lawrence, and occupies two pages in telling what every one knows just as well as Mr. Lawrence, but he has failed to show how the adoption of the Northern Central Route will in any way interfere with this ; all he says is, that, “ The
 “ great advantages possessed by St. John for an Atlantic port for
 “ the commerce of Quebec and Ontario, can be largely neutra-

"lized, if not entirely destroyed by a *wrong location of the Inter-colonial Railway*," an opinion with which we fully coincide, and to prevent this *wrong location* we are now striving.

At page 17, Mr. Lawrence, without knowing it, furnishes a strong argument in favour of the Northern Central, and against Western No. 5; if he thinks it makes for his line, we are willing to give it a wider circulation by quoting it; we merely wish the reader to observe how much better it applies to the Northern Central line than to his favourite, in all points that relate to the cheap maintenance of the road and expense of running it. "All of Canada to the westward of River Du Loup is interested in the adoption of this line, as their extensive and extending commerce requires, at all seasons of the year, the most direct route to and from the ocean. Commercial men, to secure the shortest possible road, would consider it economy to spend, were it necessary in its construction, a larger sum than would be required to build a longer and circuitous one, knowing that the saving in time, freight, fares, running expenses, and maintenance, would far more than compensate for the extra cost."

At page 18 Mr. Lawrence throws a sop to Halifax and then says:—"Its people are too *patriotic* to sacrifice such an important *strategical* point for any consideration, or to tax the two Western Provinces with additional mileage for any advantage they might derive from the selection of a Central or Northern route." This was very ingeniously done, but Mr. Lawrence forgot that at page 20 he used every effort to persuade his readers that the time had passed for any necessity of regarding either strategy or the military character of the road.

Mr. Lawrence says, page 23 of his letter: "Two of the objects of the Intercolonial Railway are to consolidate the Provinces and open up new fields for settlement. As No. 5, would not only better accomplish these than any other of the Western routes, and that without sacrificing any interest of the country, and at the same time should be unexceptionable to the British Government, its claims from a Colonial, as well as Imperial point of view, are greater than Nos. 1, 2 or 3. If any of these is

“to be chosen, No. 3 is decidedly the best, as it is not only the shortest, but it passes through the city of Fredericton, the political and military capital of New Brunswick.”

But we have shown conclusively that the claims of the Northern Central route are greater than those of any other route yet proposed, and that by it the national character of the road is secured, the commercial interests of the Dominion are best subserved, and that the cost of constructing and maintaining it will leave a large margin in its favor. Until Mr. Lawrence can disprove Major Robinson's calculations, the claims of his favorite route must give way before the vastly superior claims of the route we sincerely believe to be the best in all the respects mentioned by Mr. Lawrence.

The unblushing effrontery of Mr. Lawrence is most offensively displayed at page 25, where he actually garbles the text of Mr. Fleming's report, and by taking a piece here, and a piece there, and weaving the two into one apparently connected quotation, he makes Mr. Fleming appear to favour the very line he is pointing out as open to a serious objection. Mr. Fleming alludes to the contemplated extension of the American system of railways, and says Bangor is the extreme easterly extension as yet. “The distance thence to St. John by the route contemplated, and in part surveyed, is estimated at 200 miles. The construction of *this link* is most warmly advocated in the State of Maine and in the Province of New Brunswick; already public aid from both countries has been offered to secure its construction, and the influences and agencies at work will, I am convinced, be instrumental in finishing this line of communication at no distant day—perhaps simultaneously with, or possibly before the completion of the Intercolonial Railway,—vide Mr. Fleming's Report page 53.

Mr. Lawrence takes the first part of this, garbles it thus to suit his purpose: “Mr. Fleming in his report most justly remarks:—“It would be manifestly unwise to overlook this projected route,” making it apply to his pet line, No. 5 Western, and then he skips a whole long paragraph of eight lines, by doing which Mr. Fleming's meaning is distorted, and he takes up the text again at

the first line of the next paragraph, by interpolating the word "for" so as to make a connection with the first part of the quotation, and then quotes just as much as makes for his purpose thus:—
 "It is too apparent that the Intercolonial Railway may find in the United States route, a formidable rival for Canadian passenger traffic to and from Europe," leaving out the concluding words "by way of Halifax." Had Mr. Lawrence quoted the whole context, the argument which he distorts in his favor, would at once have been seen to be against him, or had he been honest enough to add the next paragraph, his readers would have seen through his little game, for the very next paragraph says:—"Fortunately, with a view to counteract this difficulty, *a line by the Bay Chaleurs would offer special advantages* which may be here noticed." Mr. Fleming then goes on to propound his grand scheme of ocean travel by means of a railway across Newfoundland, which scheme can be carried out only by *means of a North Shore route* for the Intercolonial Road.

After this specimen of Mr. Lawrence's fairness in dealing with the whole subject, we think both he and his letter may be dismissed into the oblivion from which they ought never to have emerged. And when we add that the Western route No. 5, necessitates the construction of two enormously expensive bridges over the St. John River, we think our readers will quite agree with us that the sooner this pet scheme of his follows him and his letter, the better for the Dominion.

APPENDIX B.

A pamphlet by Walter Buck, C. E., intituled the "Best Route for the Intercolonial Railway" is confessedly written to advocate the Frontier route. He founds its claims upon the shorter distance to be built and run, the smaller sum it will cost, and the greater amount of traffic it would afford. He does not pretend that it would serve to open up any greater extent of new country, nor that

it would serve any other interests than those of Agriculture and Lumbering.

Mr. Buck takes the bold stand that the most suitable position for a military road *is along the enemy's border*, for which idea he certainly deserves the thanks of the War Office, and should be elected honorary member of United Service Club. He then quotes no less august authority than John Bright and J. W. Lawrence to show that there is no fear of aggression from the United States. He says that Mr. Lawrence's *idea is perfect*; with which we agree, if the word *nonsense* is added. John Bright and Mr. Buck, with J. W. Lawrence to back them will hardly succeed in indoctrinating men of common sense with their utopian ideas, and we rest quite easy in the conviction that the military character of the road, as one of its features, will be insisted on by the governments. of the Dominion and of Great Britain.

He gives the following table to show the cost of the Frontier line :—

189 miles from River Du Loup to Woodstock @ \$33,400.....	\$6,312,600
115 " Moncton to Truro @ \$46,000.....	5,290,000
	<hr/>
	\$11,602,600
Proposed purchase of Woodstock Branch, 15 miles.....	176,000
" St. Andrew's Railway, 40 miles.....	700,000
Repairs and Renewals on " including additional Sidings and Station Buildings.....	100,000
	<hr/>
	\$12,578,600

He gives the mileage to be constructed as 304 miles, but omits to add Western Extension 82 miles, which we are justified in putting at the same estimate as that between Moncton and Truro, viz: \$46,000 per mile, this will make \$3,772,000 to be added to his \$12,578,600, making a total of \$16,350,600, which is \$390,600 more than we have shown the Northern Central will cost. He proposes to buy the St. Andrew's Railway, 40 miles, for \$700,000 which is \$17,500 per mile. It must be a strange road if it can be built for that, and entirely unfit for a portion of the Intercolonial, so that we are quite within the mark if we add \$17,500 more per mile for rebuilding it, this will add \$700,000 more to the cost of his frontier line, and make the total of \$17,050,000, just the nice sum of \$1,090,000 more than the Northern Central will cost.

The London *Economist* of the 9th instant has the following, which would show that this road, which has been over 15 years in building, and is now in a delapidated condition, requiring extensive repairs, may be bought for even a smaller sum than Mr. Buck names, but this only proves that a proportionably *larger* outlay than we have estimated, will be required to reconstruct it.

"From a statement of the liquidators, it appears that a sale of the line has been advertised to take place in Fredericton, New Brunswick, on the 7th December next, on behalf of the St. Stephen's Banking Company, who are creditors for about £7,200. As official liquidators appointed in England cannot by law control the proceedings in Colonial courts, they think it doubtful whether these proceedings can be stopped. The debentures debt is said to be about £250,000. The line is likely, according to recent reports, to be sold for a nominal consideration."

This may serve to show how much reliance can be placed upon the figures and arguments of Mr. Walter Buck, C. E.

He gives the population of the different counties through which the North Shore, the Central, and the Frontier lines would pass, and shows that the Frontier line will have a population of 338 inhabitants per mile, nearly half of which number he confesses is furnished by Aroostook County in Maine.

The argument based upon the number of population to the mile of country through which a railway passes is more specious than sound, but as Mr. Buck has made a parade of it in support of his frontier line, by lugging in the citizens of a foreign power, who will of course derive advantages by his line, which, in fairness, ought to be enjoyed by our own people, and which will be the case by the Northern Central line,—let us see how the latter line, in population per mile, compares with the Frontier line.

The Northern Central, from its leaving River du Loup, till it reaches Apohaqui, passes through, or offers facilities for trade, to the counties of

Rimouski	20,854
Gaspé.....	14,077
Bonaventure.....	13,092
Restigouche	5,000

Gloucester	15,076
Northumberland	18,801
Kent	15,854
Sunbury	6,057
Queens	13,359
Kings	23,283

145,453

dividing this by the number of miles between River Du Loup and Apohaqui, which is 347, we have a population of 419 to the mile ; all our own people, a great proportion of whom will, by means of this road, be brought for the first time within reach of markets for the produce of their industry.

Mr. Buck makes a great display of the resources of the Counties through which his frontier line would pass, and of course the river counties, till he reaches Woodstock, show well. After that he enlarges to a great extent upon the resources of Aroostook County in the State of Maine, and gives a detailed list of its saw mills, *lime kilns* and *shingle cutters* ; but, when speaking of the North Shore, he disposes of its resources in the most refreshingly cool and nonchalant manner. Perhaps he did not know that the single steam mill of the Hon. John Ferguson at Bathurst, turns out more sawn lumber than all the one-horse concerns he enumerates from Fredericton to the source of the St. John, including all its tributaries, while the splendid steam mills in Chatham, Douglastown, Newcastle and Nelson, to go no further up the Miramichi, are surpassed by none in the Province, either in extent or in the perfection of their equipments. From Black Brook, below Chatham, to Nelson, a distance of only 12 miles, there are no fewer than ten extensive steam mills, which cut each, on an average, 40,000 feet of boards and deals in a day. Allowing 25 working days in the month, this will be 1,000,000 feet per month for each mill. Allowing 6 working months in the year, will make each mill cut 6,000,000, and this, multiplied by ten will give an aggregate of 60,000,000 feet of lumber cut per year in the short distance above stated. To this we might add 7 water mills in different parts of the same county, which will average about 10,000 feet per day ; applying the same calculations, these will cut an aggregate

of 10,500,000, which added to the product of the steam mills, will make a total of 70,500,000 feet for the County of Northumberland alone.

So much for Mr. Buck's elaborate show of the capabilities of his route for manufactured lumber.

Mr. Buck occupies no less than four pages of his pamphlet in enumerating the resources of Aroostook County, but we presume no one, except Mr. Lawrence and himself, wishes to build up a foreign country at the expense of the Dominion. Take from the total of his calculations of population and traffic by the Frontier route, all that he confesses will be derived from Aroostook County, and we will then see how much remains in its favor.

Now, we can give tables too, and we ask the public to compare the following one with that given by Mr. Buck, and to remember that *all* the Counties in the table below, are passed through or benefited by the Northern Central, and our own people alone will profit by this route :—

Name of County.	Tons Hay.	Bushels Oats.	Bushels Potatoes.	Bushels Turnips.	Butter, lbs.	No. of Parishes.
King's.....	7,474	62,908	71,267	16,695	122,850	1
Queen's.....	8,601	66,318	91,688	6,937	145,692	4
Sunbury.....	6,067	26,936	37,207	10,027	62,053	2
Kent.....	5,852	128,580	301,013	18,170	119,463	5
Westmorland....	4,452	34,991	65,455	9,930	55,895	1
Gloucester.....	5,423	59,074	161,944	18,172	57,998	2
Restigouche.....	4,517	77,851	130,537	16,795	70,874	5
Bonaventure.....	7,992	121,961	368,535	19,027	145,663	11
Gaspé.....	7,521	40,498	203,284	17,625	103,371	16
Rimouski.....	8,657	71,311	457,371	2,103	221,056	13
Total.....	66,529	690,438	1,888,101	131,461	1,104,915	60

This shows that as regards Agricultural Produce, the Northern Central will far surpass the Frontier line in the Counties it will pass through.

Mr. Buck gives a statement of the Ship-building interest on the North Shore, as follows, which is under, rather than over the truth :—

" The total amount of tonnage registered of vessels built in 1865,
" is as follows :

" Dalhousie.....	1	vessel,	627	tons.
" Bathurst	6	"	2,334	"
" Newcastle and } " Chatham..... }	15	"	10,536	"
" Kouchibouguac..	1	"	356	"
" Richibucto	5	"	2,905	"
	18		16,758	tons.

" The shipping business in 1865 at these ports in thus repre-
" sented :—

" Vessels British and Foreign arrived with cargoes and Ballast.

Vessels.	Tons.	Vessels.	Tons.
" Dalhousie....	219..44,628	Bathurst.....	149..19,484
" Chatham	319..61,936	Newcastle.....	160..38,486
" Richibucto....	48..48,715	Bathurst village.	91..11,831
		Total 1204 vessels,—	225,212 tons.

" Cargoes cleared same year :

Vessels	Tons.	Vessels.	Tons.
" Dalhousie....	178..44,140	Bathurst.....	131..22,062
" Chatham....	193..50,108	Newcastle....	196..57,174
" Richibucto... 264..53,777		Buctouche....	125..14,042
		Total 1087 vessels..	241,303 tons.

The fact stated by Wm. Smith, Esq., in the Trade and Navigation Returns of New Brunswick, (a work compiled with great labor and care, and highly creditable to that efficient officer,) " that on account of the immense ship-building interest on the " North Shore, a Surveyor " has been stationed at Miramichi," while " the Surveyor of British Lloyd's formerly stationed in Nova " Scotia, has been withdrawn, the business in that Province not " being of sufficient extent to require the full services of a Surveyor," shows conclusively in what light Lloyd's Office regards the North Shore.

On the subject of the Fisheries, Mr. Buck has said just enough to show that *he did not wish to say more*. We will supply what it did not suit Mr. Buck's purpose to make known.

The following statement of the fish taken in 1867, on the New Brunswick shores of the Gulf of St. Lawrence along which the Northern Central Line will pass, compiled from returns obtained from that painstaking and indefatigable officer, Mr. W. F. Whitcher, of the Fisheries Department, will serve to show the extent of this interest at the present time :—

1,386,000 lbs. Salmon @ 10cts.	\$138,600
29,205 barrels Wet Fsh @ \$3,	87,615
20,359 qtls. Cod..... @ 3,	61,077
	<hr/>
	\$287,292

But if we take from the same returns, as we have a perfect right to do, in considering the effect of the Northern Central Line on the fisheries, the quantities caught in Bonaventure, Gaspé and Rimouski, they will show as follows :

	Dry Fish.		Wet Fish.
Bonaventure,....	10,076	102,336
Gaspé.....	113,699	21,782
Rimouski.....	1,598	4,102

Besides which Rimouski sends fresh to the markets of Canada 393,228 lbs., Gaspé, 2,783 lbs., Bonaventure, 6,387 lbs.

From this statement it will be seen what the Northern Central line will do for this vast region, so rich in natural resources. Here we find that Rimouski, having partial connection with the great Canadian Markets, on account of its proximity, sends no less than 393,228 lbs of *fresh fish*, while Gaspé and Bonaventure which are, at present, deprived of this connection, send only 9,170 lbs, while it is well known that these Counties offer greater facilities for this *fresh fish* trade than other portions of the Coast.

In this connection we would wish to call the attention of the Representatives of those great Constituencies of Canada, into whose daily food, fresh fish so largely enters, how much their interests will be sacrificed if mere sectional intrigues are allowed to sway Parliament in the decision of this question.

Mr. Buck places before his readers the statement of one Thomas Leach, Purser on board the "Arabian" in 1860, to show

the limited trade that may be expected from the North Shore. Now, we happen to know something of this matter, and can confidently declare that during the past season there have been employed the steamers "Lady Head," the "Emperor," the "Secret," and the "Gaspé," and that occasional trips along the same route have been made by the "Napoleon III," and by "Her Majesty," the latter vessel bringing freight from the inland Lakes of Canada, and that even with this accommodation, the vessels have frequently had to refuse freight at the different ports, although many sailing packets have also been employed upon the same route. We have made enquiries and have learned that the "Lady Head" has made good returns upon the route which Mr. Buck, C. E. considers of such small importance. Mr. Buck has rather overreached himself in this argument, and has committed the error of "showing his cards" too plainly.

The manner in which Mr. Buck quotes Mr. Lawrence, and in which the latter returns the compliment, would lead those unacquainted with the gentlemen to suppose that they were unexceptionable authorities on all matters pertaining to railways and their routes, but to those who know them both, this little game excites only a smile of derision.

Notwithstanding this interchange of compliments, each can knock away the superstructure of the other's argument when it suits his purpose. Take the following as a specimen of the manner in which Mr. Buck tickles Mr. Lawrence, while at the same time he demolishes his argument:—

"THE WESTERN ROUTE CONSIDERED."

"This route is ably advocated by Mr. Lawrence, in his letter
 "to the Minister of Public Works," * * * * *
 Mr. Buck describes this line, and says that the chief objection in point of magnitude and cost, is that the River St. John will have to be crossed at Fredericton, and then he adds:—"Another objection is, that leaving Grand Falls for the Eastward much of the Aroostook trade is lost, and the Eastern side of the river is but a wilderness, Mr. Lawrence here departs from his own axiom "that railroads should *follow* population, not *precede* it. Again,

"Mr. Lawrence says, 'To ask them [the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario] to sacrifice this all important consideration, [a short highway to the ocean] that the Intercolonial may pass through the wilderness section of New Brunswick to open up a field for settlement for the benefit of that Province, would be requiring from them too much.' Now No. 3 line runs a distance of at least 60 miles through the wilderness."

See, now, an instance of the manner in which Mr. Lawrence takes the wind out of Mr. Buck's sails. At page 23 of his letter, in reference to the Frontier routes, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, he says:—

"One of the chief arguments in favor of the Western routes, Nos. 1, 2 and 3, is, that from the population of the North Eastern Section of Maine, considerable traffic would be secured to the Intercolonial. It has been already shown that No. 5 route would secure all the traffic of that section of country that either of these would. Were it otherwise, that in itself, would be no reason for locating the Intercolonial by the Frontier. As it would be unwise to build it *away from the frontier* on military grounds, to the sacrifice of the Commercial interests of the Dominion, it would be as unwise to build it *close to and parallel* with the frontier for forty miles, for the traffic of the Aroostook Section of Maine, to the *permanent injury* of the Central and North Eastern sections of New Brunswick, and without one solitary compensating advantage to the other sections of the Dominion."

Mr. Buck, like his "illustrious predecessor," tries to make his readers believe that by the Northern Central route the "trains would be snow-drifted, and frozen in for a whole winter." These men surely rate the intelligence of their readers at a low standard, or are themselves ignorant of common natural truths. But, as we have fully shown, in the course of our remarks, under the Economical view, that the Northern Central has all the advantage in this respect, we shall waste no time in refuting Walter Buck, C. E., but will merely advise him to read up his natural philosophy. We understand, upon reliable authority, that he is the paid advocate of parties interested in Railways in Charlotte county and may shortly be here in the interest of that section—of course he must do something to show that "the laborer is worthy of his hire."

In an Appendix Mr. Buck gives *his* estimate of the cost of building the Northern line from River du Loup to Apohaqui, and puts the price per mile at \$45,000. The cool assurance of this, in the face of Major Robinson's estimate, based upon his accurate survey, is every way worthy the presumption of Walter Buck, C. E., but he must not be offended if we prefer to be guided by the Major of Engineers. We have shown that the Northern Central is the cheapest line that can be built, and the cheapest to maintain and run. The evidence of this is before our readers and his, they can judge between the authority of Walter Buck, C. E., and a Major of the Royal Engineer Department of Great Britain.

In conclusion we have merely to repeat, that the subject is one of vast importance, and involves momentous consequences in its effects upon the future of the Dominion. We trust, therefore, that the representatives of the People, now in Parliament assembled, will bring to its discussion, cool heads and calm, dispassionate judgment, in a spirit elevated far above the petty intrigues of mere sectional interests and that they will, after mature deliberation, select that route which will receive the hearty assent of the British Government, and secure the best interests, present and future, of Our Common Country.

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